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Clean Water Act Section 401:  
Balancing States’ Rights and the Nation’s Need for  
Energy Infrastructure 
 
Deidre Duncan & Clare Ellis** 
 
Over the past several decades, significant tension has developed 
between the federal role in overseeing and authorizing certain types of 
energy infrastructure projects and states’ roles in regulating water quality 
under the cooperative federalism structure of the Clean Water Act (CWA 
or the Act).1 This tension has played itself out in various contexts, but the 
most pronounced in recent years has been the battle over CWA Section 401 
water quality certifications for energy infrastructure projects, in particular 
interstate natural gas pipelines.  
The CWA was enacted with the intent of preserving states’ roles in 
protecting water quality within their borders. The federal government plays 
the primary role in authorizing large-scale energy and infrastructure 
projects, however, in recognition of the fact that uniform and streamlined 
procedures are necessary for the review and approval of such projects and 
that local oversight and control could impede their development in a 
manner contrary to the national interest. Congress attempted to balance 
 
  Deidre Duncan is a partner at Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP and Co-Chair of the 
firm’s Environmental Practice Group. Deidre represents energy and development clients on 
permitting, compliance, and litigation relating to the Clean Water Act and other 
environmental statutes. She is well known for obtaining permits for complicated 
infrastructure projects including oil and natural gas pipelines and defending those permits 
in litigation. Prior to joining Hunton, Deidre served as Assistant Army General Counsel, 
advising the Secretary of the Army on environmental matters involving the Corps of 
Engineers’ civil works and regulatory programs. JD, University of Cincinnati College of 
Law, Order of the Coif, 1996; BA, Duke University, cum laude, 1993. 
**  Clare Ellis is an associate at Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, focusing on regulatory 
matters related to transportation and energy project planning and execution. She advises 
clients on compliance, permitting, and other matters arising under state and federal 
environmental, safety, and transportation laws. JD, University of Georgia School of Law, 
summa cum laude, Order of the Coif; MA, Literature, University of Georgia; BA, University 
of Virginia. 
1. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012) (setting forth congressional 
policy under the CWA to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States” to address pollution and to conduct planning for development and use of 
land and water resources within their borders).  
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these state and federal oversight roles by expressly preserving states’ 
authority over water quality and other types of environmental impacts for 
certain infrastructure construction projects, such as interstate natural gas 
pipelines built under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), which are otherwise 
subject to comprehensive and exclusive federal oversight.2 This overlay of 
state and federal authority has become fraught with tension in recent years, 
as pipeline projects have become a symbolic focus for states and activist 
groups politically opposed to the use of fossil fuels generally. It is 
increasingly common for states to use their CWA Section 401 water quality 
certification (WQC) authority to stall or to impede these and other 
infrastructure projects for reasons unrelated to water quality, such as the 
state’s stance on energy policy, a perceived need to placate local opposition 
to a project, or other localized political concerns. Even where certification 
is granted by the state, it can become a focal point for opposition groups 
seeking to challenge the state’s decision in hopes of stopping projects they 
find objectionable. 
Section I of this article provides background on the CWA Section 401 
certification process and the statutory framework for interstate natural gas 
pipeline authorization under NGA Section 7. Section II discusses specific 
problems with the Section 401 process, explaining several ambiguities that 
have sparked litigation, causing costly delays or altogether obstructing the 
development of needed infrastructure and energy projects. Section III 
evaluates the various avenues for addressing these problems via legislative, 
administrative, judicial, or executive action. Section IV concludes by 
advocating for Section 401 reform, starting with congressional efforts to 
revise the CWA to enhance clarity and to reduce inefficiencies in the WQC 
process. 
I.  Background 
Under CWA Section 401(a), any applicant for a federal license or 
permit to conduct activities that may result in discharges to navigable 
waters must provide the federal authorizing agency a certification from the 
state in which the discharge originates that the discharge will comply with 
specified requirements of the Act, including state water quality standards.3 
 
2. See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Connecticut Dept. of Envt’l Prot., 482 F. 3d 79, 84 
(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Islander E. Pipeline Co., 102 FERC ¶ 61,054, at P 115 at 61,130 
(2003) (order on rehearing) for the proposition that “[w]hile state and local permits are 
preempted under the NGA, state authorizations required under federal law are not.”). 
3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2018) 
(providing that State water quality standards are generally comprised of designated uses for 
waterbodies, water quality criteria sufficient to protect the designated uses, and an anti-
degradation policy). 
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The state’s certification must set forth any effluent and other limitations, 
and monitoring requirements necessary to assure compliance with the Act 
and with any other appropriate requirement of state law set forth in the 
certification.4 These requirements specified in the state’s certification 
become conditions on the federal license or permit.5  
The CWA places a one-year limit on the amount of time that a state 
has to respond to a request for Section 401 certification, providing that if 
the state “fails or refuses to act on a request for certification, within a 
reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of 
such request, the certification requirements of this subsection shall be 
waived with respect to such Federal application.”6 Congress intended this 
time limitation to prevent projects from being subjected to unreasonable 
delays because states failed to act in a timely fashion on requests for 
certification.7 Representative Edmondson, who sponsored the amendment, 
made clear that a state must do more than merely make efforts towards 
certification within the time allotted: “the State must act, either to grant or 
to deny the certification.”8  
The federal license or permit may not be granted until WQC has been 
obtained or certification waived by the state.9 Likewise, if a state denies 
certification, the federal license or permit may not be granted.10 CWA 
Section 401 thus provides a powerful tool for states to impose conditions 
upon federal authorizations for a wide range of activities, or to deny 
certification altogether—allowing “a single state agency [to] effectively 
 
4. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2012). 
5. Id.; see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 648 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (finding Corps, as federal permitting agency, cannot override or alter state WQC 
conditions, even where Corps deemed alternative condition more environmentally 
protective). 
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  
7. See 115 Cong. Rec. 9,264 (Apr. 16, 1969) (statement of Rep. Edmondson 
explaining that the amendment intended to “do away with dalliance or unreasonable delay 
and to require a ‘yes’ or ‘no’” by states). Based upon the legislative history of the provision, 
the D.C. Circuit has said of CWA Section 401 that, “[i]n imposing a one-year time limit on 
States to ‘act,’ Congress plainly intended to limit the amount of time that a State could delay 
a federal licensing proceeding without making a decision on the certification request” and 
that “this [interpretation] is clear from the plain text” of the CWA. Alcoa Power Generating 
Inc. v. FERC, 643 F. 3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, the Conference Report on 
Section 401 states that the time limitation was meant to ensure that ‘sheer inactivity by the 
State . . . will not frustrate the Federal application.’”). 
8. 115 Cong. Rec. 9,264, supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  
10. Id. 
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veto[] an energy [project] that has secured approval from a host of other 
federal and state agencies.”11  
Interstate natural gas pipelines are also subject to the NGA 
requirement to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizing 
construction and operation.12 NGA Section 7 confers upon FERC 
“exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation . . . of natural gas in 
interstate commerce,”13 including via pipeline.14 In enacting the NGA, 
Congress “intended to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law by 
establishing through the NGA a ‘comprehensive scheme of federal 
regulation of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce.’”15 While 
state laws touching upon topics within FERC’s regulatory purview under 
NGA Section 7 are preempted, such as the environmental effects of 
interstate natural gas pipeline construction,16 the NGA saves from 
preemption states’ statutory roles under the CWA, Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA).17 
 
11. Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 164 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 911 at 122 (1972) (explaining that “[d]enial of certification by a State . . . 
results in a complete prohibition against the issuance of the Federal license or permit.”).  
12. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(a) (2012). FERC has long taken the 
position that issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity under NGA 
Section 7 does not trigger the CWA Section 401 certification requirement. See, e.g., Ruby 
Pipeline, L.L.C., 133 FERC ¶ 61,015 at P 23 (Oct. 6, 2010). This is because the Certificate 
does not in itself authorize activities that will result in a discharge under the CWA, and thus 
certification is not required. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC’s position on this issue in 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
13. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988).  
14. Similarly, under NGA Section 3, the Department of Energy (DOE) and FERC 
share jurisdiction over various aspects of the export of natural gas from the United States. 
Specifically, DOE regulates the export of natural gas as a commodity (including LNG). 
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). While FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
the siting, construction, expansion, and operation of LNG import and export facilities. 15 
U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012). As in NGA Section 7, despite the predominantly federal 
framework for LNG oversight, NGA Section 3 expressly preserves state authority under the 
CWA, CZMA, and CAA. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (2012). 
15. Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, 723 F.3d 238, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
16. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 377 F. 3d 817 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an Iowa regulation of the environmental effects of interstate natural gas 
pipeline construction was pre-empted by FERC oversight under the NGA). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d).  
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II.  The Problem 
States have on several occasions used their Section 401 authority to 
veto projects sited in their jurisdictions for a variety of reasons, often 
unrelated to water quality.18 Even where the state issues certification, WQC 
issues are commonly the subject of litigation, particularly where opponents 
of a specific project use water quality-related objections as a proxy for their 
objections to other aspects of the project.19 Such litigation significantly 
impedes the ability of proponents to deliver needed energy projects in a 
timely manner and on a schedule that is predictable enough to encourage 
investment.20  
Judicial oversight of the Section 401 process through litigation also 
creates a patchwork of precedent on the scope and timing of certifications, 
making the process even more unpredictable for future projects. In this 
section, we survey the principal issues to arise in recent years in the Section 
401 context and the manner in which courts and agencies have attempted 
to address these issues, which include: (1) the limitations on the one-year 
period for state WQC review; (2) the proper scope of such review and the 
types of conditions that states may impose upon certification; and 
(3) finality and reviewability of the certification once issued.  
 
18.  See, e.g., Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Adm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation, Re: Joint Application: DEC Permit # 0-9999-00181/00024 Water 
Quality Certification/Notice of Denial, to Lynda Schubring, Envtl. Project Manager, 
Constitution Pipeline Co. (Apr. 22, 2016); Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Adm’r, 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Re: Joint Application: NYSDEC Permit Nos. 9-
9909-00123/00004 (Water Quality Certification) et al. Notice of Denial, to Ronald Kraemer, 
Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Co. (Apr. 7 2017); Letter from Thomas S. Berkman, Deputy Comm’r 
and Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Re: 3-3399-0071/00001 – 
Valley Lateral Project Notice of Decision, to Georgia Carter, Vice President and Gen. 
Counsel, Millennium Pipeline Co. (Aug. 30, 2017); Letter from Maia D. Bellon, Dir., Dep’t 
of Ecology, Wash. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Section 401 Water Quality Certification 
Denial (Order No. 15417), to Kristin Gaines, Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview (Sept. 
26, 2017). 
19.  See, e.g., Joint Petition for Review, Appalachian Voices et al. v. State Water 
Control Bd. et al., No. 18-1077 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 2018); Petition for Review, Sierra Club et 
al. v. State Water Control Bd. et al., No. 17-2406 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017). 
20. New England states are already feeling the effects of constraints on new natural 
gas pipeline infrastructure, as has been widely reported and explained in report published 
last year by ISO New England. See ISO NEW ENGLAND, OPERATIONAL FUEL-SECURITY 
ANALYSIS, 16 (2018), https://perma.cc/F4MM-RDHQ (explaining that “during the coldest 
weeks of the year,” New England’s natural gas pipeline infrastructure “can’t meet all the 
demand for natural gas for both home heating and power generation” and that, as a result, 
natural-gas-fired power plants in New England “may not be able to access natural gas”).  
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A. One-Year Waiver Period 
Timely and predictable issuance of certification is crucial for energy 
and infrastructure construction projects, which are subject to tight and 
highly-prescribed schedules. Delays and uncertainty can be costly and, 
depending upon the circumstances, can kill a project.21 Section 401 
certification has historically been of the most common causes of delay in 
project execution and delivery.22 In the past few decades, the problem has 
become more pronounced—with state agencies taking a liberal view of 
when the one-year clock for acting on a certification request begins. 
Further, state agencies have adopted certain tactics to extend their time for 
review, such as asking that a project withdraw and re-submit its application 
so as to restart the waiver clock, or requesting that project sponsors specify 
by agreement a particular date that the clock is deemed to have begun 
(regardless of when the project’s application was actually submitted). 
Finally, project sponsors have received mixed messages on who ultimately 
determines whether the one-year waiver period has run. These issues have 
been the subject of recent agency and judicial pronouncements, as 
summarized below. 
When does the one-year clock start? Under the plain language of 
CWA Section 401, the one-year23 waiver period begins to run “after receipt 
 
21  Delays or impediments to natural gas infrastructure project construction can also 
result in unintended consequences such as requiring end users to employ more costly 
alternative energy supplies, prohibiting new hookups that would deliver needed energy to 
certain parts of the country (particularly in states subject to high energy demands over cold 
winters, such as the New England states), and forcing increased reliance on higher-emitting 
fuels such as coal and oil.  
22. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N STAFF, HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING 
POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND REGULATIONS, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 40 (2001), https://perma.cc/8JB7-AB87 (noting untimely receipt of 
Section 401 WQC as one of the most common causes of delays in the authorization of 
hydroelectric projects).  
23. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012). While the CWA sets one year 
as the outside timeframe considered “reasonable” for a state to act on a WQC request, certain 
agencies implementing Section 401 have designated shorter amounts of time by regulation. 
For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations provide that six 
months shall “generally be considered” to be a reasonable timeframe for issuing 
certification, “but in any event [this time period] shall not exceed one year.” 40 C.F.R. § 
121.16 (2012). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or the Corps) regulations 
governing the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permitting process specify that a state waives 
certification if it fails or refuses to act on a “valid request” for certification “within sixty 
days after receipt of such a request,” unless the District Engineer determines a shorter or 
longer period is reasonable for the state to act. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(1)(ii) (2012). The 
Assistant Secretary of the Army recently issued an internal memorandum explaining that 
the six-month period specified in the Corps regulations begins with receipt of a request for 
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of [a] request.”24 While the CWA is clear on the one-year deadline, several 
states, such as New York and New Jersey, have historically taken the 
position that the one-year waiver period does not begin to run until the state 
deems a project’s application “complete.”25 The CWA Section 401 
handbook published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
adopts this view, stating that “the certifying agency determines what 
constitutes a ‘complete application’ that starts the timeframe clock.”26 By 
engaging in a subjective, case-by-case inquiry as to whether a WQC request 
is “complete,” states have been able to manipulate the timing of the Section 
401 certification process, often putting off consideration of a project’s 
application well beyond the one-year statutory deadline. 
This practice was recently rejected, however, by the Second Circuit, 
in the context of an application submitted by Millennium Pipeline 
Company LLC (Millennium Pipeline) to the New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) for WQC for the Valley 
 
certification, and that District Engineers should determine that a longer timeframe is 
appropriate “only in special circumstances.” Memorandum from R.D. James, Ass’t Sec’y 
of the Army, to the Chief of Eng’rs (Dec. 13, 2018). According to the memorandum, giving 
states an entire year to act on a Section 401 request “is inconsistent with . . . existing Army 
regulations.” Id. at 3. The memorandum also directs the Corps to issue draft guidance 
based on this directive within forty-five days, establishing criteria to provide District 
Engineers for identifying reasonable timeframes for requiring states to provide WQC 
decisions. Id. at 4.  
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
25. 6 NYCRR § 621.4(e); N.J.A.C. 7:7A-19.2. For a recent project proposed by 
PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(NJDEP) deemed the project’s WQC application incomplete (and eventually denied 
certification in February 2018) on the basis that the project had not provided NJDEP with 
surveys of the entire pipeline route. Letter from Virginia Kop’Kash, Assistant Comm’r, N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Re: Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permit Application, DLUR File 
#0000-17-0007.2 FWW170001, PennEast Pipeline Project – Statewide, to Michael Mara 
(Feb. 1, 2018). For pipeline WQC applications, NJDEP thus appears to require that pipeline 
project proponents provide survey information for the entirety of a proposed route before it 
will deem the WQC application “complete.” Because many landowners deny project 
proponents access to perform surveys in the initial stages of a proposal, NJDEP’s standard 
for completeness effectively requires companies to have been issued a FERC Certificate of 
Public Convenience and Necessity (and thus vested with the power of eminent domain) in 
order to have access to sufficient information for their application to be deemed “complete.” 
See 15 U.S. Code § 717f(h) (conferring upon the holder of an NGA Certificate the power of 
eminent domain).  
26. EPA OFFICE OF WETLANDS, OCEANS, AND WATERSHEDS, CLEAN WATER ACT 
SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL FOR 
STATES AND TRIBES, 11 (2010), https://perma.cc/N3H7-ZPHE (citing City of Fredericksburg 
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 876 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir. 1989); 33 USC § 
1341(a)(1); CWA §401(a)(1); Del Ackels v. U.S. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 1993).  
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Lateral natural gas pipeline project.27 In that case, Millennium Pipeline’s 
initial application for WQC was deemed received by NYSDEC on 
November 23, 2015.28 Nonetheless, over the course of the next several 
months, NYSDEC notified the project that it considered its application 
“incomplete,” requesting further information in the project’s potential 
environmental impacts.29 After several additional information submittals to 
NYSDEC, Millennium Pipeline petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in December 2016 for a finding that NYSDEC had waived its 
Section 401 authority by failing to act on the project’s application within 
one year.30 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the company’s petition for lack of 
standing, holding that Millennium Pipeline could seek a remedy for the 
delay only from FERC.31 
The project thus approached FERC, requesting authorization to 
proceed with construction on the basis that NYSDEC had waived its 
certification authority.32 While that request was pending, on August 30, 
2017, NYSDEC denied Millennium’s application for certification, on the 
basis that FERC’s environmental analysis of the project was deficient in 
“fail[ing] to consider or quantify the downstream greenhouse gas emissions 
from the combustion of the natural gas transported by the Project.”33 On 
September 15, 2017, FERC issued an order (the Waiver Order) finding that 
NYSDEC had waived its certification authority by not acting on 
Millennium’s application by November 23, 2016, one year from the date 
that the Department first received Millennium’s formal written 
application.34 FERC subsequently issued a notice to proceed with 
construction, which the project did, and the Valley Lateral Project was 
placed into service on July 9, 2018.35  
 
27  N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC 884 F.3d 450, 455-56 (2nd 
Cir. 2018). 
28  Id. at 453. 
29  Id.  
30  Id.  
31. Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
32. Letter from Barbara Deathe, Paralegal, Millennium Pipeline Co., Request for 
Notice to Proceed with Construction, Millennium Pipeline Company LLC, Docket No. 
CP16-17-000, to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (July 21, 
2017).  
33. Letter from Thomas S. Berkman to Ronald Kraemer, supra note 18, at 2.  
34. Millennium Pipeline Co., 160 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2017).  
35. Letter from George Flugrad, Counsel, Millennium Pipeline Co., Re: Valley 
Lateral Project In-Service Notification, Millennium Valley Pipeline LLC, Docket No. CP16-
17-000 to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (July 16, 2018).  
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NYSDEC challenged FERC’s Waiver Order in the Second Circuit, 
which upheld the Waiver Order and agreed with FERC that NYSDEC had 
waived certification authority for the project. According to the Second 
Circuit,  
 
[t]he plain language of Section 401 outlines a bright-line rule 
regarding the beginning of review: the timeline for a state’s action 
regarding a request for certification ‘shall not exceed one year’ 
after ‘receipt of such request.’ It does not specify that this time 
limit applies only for ‘complete’ applications. If the statute 
required ‘complete’ applications, states could blur this bright-line 
rule into a subjective standard, dictating that applications are 
‘complete’ only when state agencies decide that they have all the 
information they need. The state agencies could thus theoretically 
request supplemental information indefinitely.36  
 
With this ruling, the Court affirmed FERC’s long-held position that the 
one-year waiver period begins upon receipt of a request for certification 
and is not tied to any subjective determination of the application’s 
completeness.37 This interpretation has been enshrined in FERC regulations 
governing applications for hydropower licenses since 1987,38 and FERC 
has long recognized the “substantial benefits” flowing from its 
interpretation, including that it “provides the maximum allowable time 
prescribed by the [CWA],” but also serves the public interest by “avoiding 
uncertainty associated with open-ended certification deadlines.”39 It also 
prevents states from “delay[ing] indefinitely”—via case-by-case 
assessments of whether a project’s request is deemed acceptable for 
processing—“their acceptance of a certification request, in contravention 
 
36. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455-56 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
37. Constitution Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,014 at P 16 (2018) (citing Millennium 
Pipeline Co., 160 FERC ¶ 61,065, at P 13 (2017); Millennium Pipeline Co.,161 FERC ¶ 
61,186 at PP 1, 9, 40-41 (2017) (order denying reh’g); Georgia Strait Crossing Pipeline LP, 
107 FERC ¶ 61,065 at P 7 (2004); AES Sparrows Point LNG, 129 FERC ¶ 61,245 at P 63 
(2009). 
38. See 18 C.F.R. § 4.34(b)(5)(iii) (2018) (“A certifying agency is deemed to have 
waived the certification requirements of section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act if the 
certifying agency has not denied or granted certification by one year after the date the 
certifying agency received a written request for certification.”); see also Waiver of the Water 
Quality Certification Requirements of Section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 5446 (Feb. 23, 1987). Note that there is no corresponding FERC regulation under the 
NGA. 
39. Constitution Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,014 at P 16 (2018). 
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of the Congress’ intent, through the waiver provision, to prevent 
unreasonable delays (i.e., of more than one year).”40 
While the issue of when the waiver period begins has been judicially 
resolved in the Second Circuit, the question remains for projects being built 
in other regions of the country. The Second Circuit opinion also does not 
clear up the patchwork of interpretations by various state and federal 
agencies memorialized in their regulations and guidance. FERC’s 
interpretation appears to have been cited favorably on occasion in other 
circuits,41 yet it is generally accepted that FERC’s CWA interpretations are 
not authoritative, given that “FERC is not charged in any manner with 
administering the [CWA].”42  
May a state restart the statutory clock by asking an applicant to 
withdraw and resubmit its WQC request? State agencies needing more 
time for their WQC review often request that applicants withdraw and 
resubmit their applications, taking the position that the waiver clock starts 
anew with each resubmittal. This tactic was used most recently by 
NYSDEC in the context of an interstate natural gas pipeline project 
proposed by Constitution Pipeline Company, LLC (Constitution). 
NYSDEC denied WQC for that project on April 22, 2016, nearly three 
years after receiving the project’s initial application.43 The NYSDEC denial 
came after years of back-and-forth and agency delays, including two 
requests by NYSDEC that the project withdraw and resubmit its application 
to restart the one-year waiver clock.  
Constitution appealed the April 2016 WQC denial to the Second 
Circuit, on the grounds that NYSDEC had exceeded the statutory one-year 
 
40. Waiver of the Water Quality Certification Requirements of Section 401(a)(1) of 
the Clean Water Act, 52 Fed. Reg. at 5446. 
41. See, e.g., State of California ex. rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. FERC, 
966 F.2d 1541, 1553-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing FERC’s approach). 
42. AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721, 730 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Alabama Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also 
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1102 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2019) (“because 
FERC is not the agency charged with administering the CWA, the Court owes no deference 
to its interpretation of Section 401 or its conclusion regarding the states’ waiver.”); Alcoa 
Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“the Commission 
concedes that its interpretation of Section 401 is entitled to no deference by the court because 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and not the Commission, is charged with 
administering the [CWA].”). 
43. Letter from John Ferguson to Lynda Schubring, supra note 18, at 1. NYSDEC 
cited as reasons for its denial that “the Application fails in a meaningful way to address the 
significant water resource impacts that could occur from this Project and has failed to 
provide sufficient information to demonstrate compliance with New York State water 
quality standards.” Id.  
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time limit for review and that the denial was arbitrary and capricious.44 The 
Second Circuit dismissed the first claim regarding the timeliness of the 
NYSDEC decision for lack of jurisdiction under the NGA.45 The Court also 
denied the petition on the merits, deferring to the agency’s expertise in 
determining that it lacked sufficient information to issue WQC for the 
project.46 Constitution also petitioned FERC for a declaratory order finding 
that NYSDEC had waived its WQC authority. FERC denied the petition on 
January 11, 2018, finding that the one-year waiver period had re-started 
each time that Constitution, at NYSDEC’s request, withdrew and 
resubmitted its application.47 According to FERC’s January 2018 order 
denying Constitution’s petition, “once an application is withdrawn, no 
matter how formulaic or perfunctory the process of withdrawal and 
resubmission is, the refiling of an application restarts the one-year waiver 
period under [CWA] section 401(a)(1).”48 
 
44. Petition for Review, Constitution Pipeline Co. v. NYSDEC et al., No. 16-1568 
(2d Cir. May 16, 2016).  
45. Constitution Pipeline Co. v. NYSDEC et al., 868 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2017). 
The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction over Constitution’s argument that 
NYSDEC had waived Section 401 authority under the NGA exclusive jurisdiction provision 
at 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he United States Court of 
Appeals for the circuit in which a facility subject to . . . section 717f of this title is proposed 
to be constructed . . . shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for 
the review of an order or action of a . . . State administrative agency acting pursuant to 
federal law to . . . deny any . . . approval . . . required under Federal law . . .” (emphasis 
added). Id. at 99. By contrast, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(2) (2012) provides that “The [D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the 
review of an alleged failure to act by a . . . State administrative agency acting pursuant to 
Federal law to issue, condition, or deny any permit required under Federal law . . .” 
(emphasis added). The Second Circuit interpreted the latter provision to apply to 
Constitution’s argument that NYSDEC failed to act within a mandated time period. 
Constitution Pipeline Co. v. NYSDEC et al., 868 F.3d at 99. It thus found that the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals had “exclusive” jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717r(d)(2) and dismissed Constitution’s timeliness argument for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 
at 100. 
46.  Constitution Pipeline Co. v. NYSDEC et al., 868 F.3d at 103. The United States 
Supreme Court subsequently denied Constitution’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
the Second Circuit ruling. See Constitution Pipeline Co. v. NYSDEC et al., 868 F.3d 87, 
100 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018) (No. 17-1009). 
47. Constitution Pipeline Co., 162 FERC ¶ 61,014 at P 23 (2018) (explaining that 
“once an application is withdrawn, no matter how formulaic or perfunctory the process of 
withdrawal and resubmission is, the refiling of an application restarts the one-year waiver 
period under [CWA] section 401(a)(1)”). 
48. Id. The Second Circuit took a similar position in the context of the Millennium 
Pipeline Valley Lateral (albeit in dicta in its 2018 order upholding FERC’s Waiver Order), 
explaining that where a state deems an application to be incomplete and needs more time 
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Constitution sought review of the FERC decision in the D.C. Circuit 
in September 2018.49 The case was held in abeyance, however, pending the 
outcome of Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, which also presented the question 
of whether a state agency may manipulate the one-year waiver period by 
requesting that an applicant repeatedly withdraw and resubmit their 
application.50 The D.C. Circuit issued a decision in Hoopa Valley in 
January 2019, staking out a contrary position to the one taken by FERC in 
its January 2018 order. 
In Hoopa Valley, the Court considered whether California and Oregon 
had waived Section 401 certification for the relicensing of the Klamath 
Hydroelectric Project located on the Klamath River in both states.51 As part 
of negotiations over the project with several stakeholders, the project 
proponent and the state agencies had agreed to defer the one-year statutory 
limitation for Section 401 certification by annual withdrawal and re-
submittal of the project’s request for certification.52 After petitioning FERC 
unsuccessfully, the Hoopa Valley Tribe sued in the D.C. Circuit, alleging 
that the states had waived their Section 401 authority and that the project 
sponsor had correspondingly failed to diligently prosecute its licensing 
application for the project.53  
In resolving the case, the Court in Hoopa Valley addressed a single 
issue: whether a state waives its Section 401 authority when, pursuant to an 
agreement between the state and applicant, an applicant repeatedly 
withdraws-and-resubmits its request for WQC over a period of time greater 
than one year. According to the Court, “[d]etermining the effectiveness of 
such a withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme is an undemanding inquiry 
because Section 401’s text is clear,” requiring action from the state within 
one year of “a request.”54 The Court thus rejected the notion that applicants 
and state reviewing agencies may circumvent the congressionally 
prescribed one year period for review by repeatedly withdrawing and 
resubmitting the same WQC application in a way that could indefinitely 
delay federal licensing proceedings and undermine FERC’s jurisdiction to 
 
for information-gathering, one available option is to “request that the applicant withdraw 
and resubmit the application,” presumably starting a new period for review. NYSDEC v. 
FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2018). 
49. Petition for Review, Constitution Pipeline Co. v. FERC, No. 18-1251 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 14, 2018).  
50. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2019). 
51. Id. at 1103. 
52. Id. at 1101. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
1 - ELLIS AND DUNCAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019 1:34 PM 




regulate such matters.55 The Court emphasized that while a year was the 
“absolute maximum” amount of time for the state’s certification, this “does 
not preclude a finding of waiver prior to the passage of a full year.”56 The 
D.C. Circuit’s decision would thus appear to prohibit the withdrawal-and-
resubmission practice commonly requested by states (and used by 
NYSDEC in the Constitution pipeline project) to prolong the statutory 
review period, at least in instances where the applicant repeatedly 
withdraws and resubmits the same application, with no “new” request 
justifying additional time for review.57 In light of this decision, FERC filed 
a motion requesting that the D.C. Circuit remand its January 2018 decision 
denying Constitution’s request for a declaratory order that NYSDEC had 
waived its WQC authority, in light of Hoopa Valley.58 The Court granted 
FERC’s request on February 28, 2019.59, 60 
May a state extend the one-year review period by agreement with the 
applicant? Hoopa Valley also casts doubt on a state agency’s ability to 
extend its review time by agreement with the applicant, as done for the 
 
55. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 913 F.3d at 1104. 
56.  Id.  
57. Id. Hoopa Valley has been read to apply narrowly to only the circumstances 
reviewed in that case, where a project repeatedly withdraws and resubmits the same 
application, without any new information included in any of the re-submittals. It is unclear, 
for instance, whether the D.C. Circuit would reach a similar decision in a case where the 
resubmittals contained new information at the request of the state reviewing agency. The 
Court did not provide any guidance in its decision as to how much new information included 
in a resubmittal would be enough to make a refiled application sufficiently “new” so as to 
restart the statutory clock. On March 11, 2019, several nongovernmental organizations who 
were intervenors in the case (American Rivers, California Trout, and Trout Unlimited) 
requested panel hearing or rehearing en banc. Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En 
Banc, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, No. 14-1271 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 2019). Numerous 
states and other parties filed amicus briefs in support of this request.   
58. FERC Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Remand, Constitution Pipeline Co. v. 
FERC, No. 18-1251 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2019).  
59.  Order, Constitution Pipeline Co. v. FERC, No. 18-1251 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 
2019). 
60.  The D.C. Circuit decision in Hoopa Valley could also have potential implications 
for the currently pending WQC application for the Jordan Cove liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
export terminal project proposed to be located in Coos County, Oregon. In October 2017, 
the sponsor of that project—Jordan Cove LNG—applied for WQC from the Oregon 
Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export 
terminal proposed to be located in Coos County, Oregon. On September 25, 2018, however, 
Jordan Cove withdrew and re-submitted its request for WQC “to allow [ODEQ] additional 
time to consider Jordan Cove’s certification request.” Letter from Christopher Stine, Water 
Quality Engineer, to Tony Diocee, Vice President of LNG Projects, Jordan Cove Energy 
Project L.P., Oregon Dep’t of Env’tl Quality (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/V5HV-
FNX5. The request remains pending before ODEQ. 
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Northern Access natural gas pipeline project proposed by National Fuel 
Supply Corporation and Empire Pipeline, Inc. (together, “National Fuel”). 
National Fuel originally submitted a request for WQC to NYSDEC for that 
project on March 2, 2016. However, it signed a letter on January 20, 2017, 
at the request of NYSDEC, agreeing that for the purposes of CWA Section 
401, that the project’s application would be deemed received on April 6, 
2016, thereby extending the date for NYSDEC to make a final 
determination to April 7, 2017.61 
Nonetheless, when FERC approved the project on February 3, 2017, 
conditioned on receipt of authorizations required under federal law 
(including the WQC), National Fuel sought rehearing of the FERC order—
claiming that it was not required to obtain a WQC from NYSDEC because 
the agency had waived certification. This request was still pending when 
NYSDEC denied the project’s request for certification on April 7, 2017, on 
the basis that the project’s application “fail[ed] to demonstrate compliance 
with New York State water quality standards.”62 On August 8, 2018, FERC 
issued an order on National Fuel’s request for rehearing, determining that 
NYSDEC had waived certification by failing to act within one year, and 
that the agreement between NYSDEC and the project sponsors was an 
invalid attempt to override the one-year statutory deadline in the CWA.63 
NYSDEC and others requested rehearing of FERC’s August 8, 2018 order. 
FERC granted the requests for rehearing on September 12, 2018. While 
FERC rehearing proceedings on this order are still pending, it seems likely 
that FERC will stand by its original ruling in light of Hoopa Valley. 
Meanwhile, National Fuel challenged the NYSDEC April 2017 denial 
in the Second Circuit, alleging that NYSDEC relied on improper 
considerations and applied a heightened standard of proof in its WQC 
decision, and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.64 On February 
5, 2019, the Court vacated the denial, remanding it to NYSDEC “for the 
limited purpose of giving the Department and opportunity to explain more 
clearly—should it choose to do so—the basis for its decision.”65 With 
respect to whether NYSDEC had waived certification by exceeding the 
 
61. Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Administrator, NYSDEC, to Ronald 
Kramer, Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corporation and Empire Pipeline, Inc. (Apr. 7, 2017) at n.1, 
https://perma.cc/SEG3-TGWU (quoting the relevant portion of the agreement). 
62. Id. at 1.  
63. FERC, Order on Rehearing and Motion for Waiver Determination under Section 
401 of the Clean Water Act, 164 FERC ¶ 61,084 (Aug. 6, 2018) at P 42.  
64. Final Br. for Pet’rs, Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. NYSDEC, No. 17-1164 
(Sept. 1, 2017). 
65.  Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. NYSDEC, No. 17-1164 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2019). 
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one-year statutory timeframe, the Court explained that such a “failure-to-
act claim is one over which the District of Columbia Circuit would have 
‘exclusive’ jurisdiction.”66 It also explained that “Petitioners are free to 
present any evidence of waiver to FERC in the first instance.”67 The Court 
failed to acknowledge that FERC had in fact already deemed the 
certification waived in its August 2018 order and that, because rehearing 
on FERC’s order is still pending, it is not ripe for review. The ruling thus 
creates a situation where NYSDEC, at the direction of the Second Circuit, 
will be undertaking review and reissuance of its WQC decision, despite a 
determination from FERC that it waived its Section 401 authority. 
Who determines if time is up and a state has waived certification? 
There has also been ambiguity in the Section 401 process as to who a 
project may turn to for a definitive determination that a state has waived its 
certification authority. In its 2017 decision regarding the Millennium 
Pipeline Valley Lateral project, the D.C. Circuit ruled that—in the context 
of projects requiring FERC authorization under the NGA—if a project 
proponent thinks the state has delayed beyond one year (i.e., waived 
certification) the project must make its case for waiver to FERC and request 
a Notice to Proceed rather than petitioning a court for a waiver 
determination.68 
According to the Court, “[e]ven if [NYSDEC] ha[d] unlawfully 
delayed acting on Millennium’s application, its inaction would operate as 
a waiver, enabling Millennium to bypass the Department and proceed to 
obtain approval from FERC,” thus NYSDEC’s delay “cause[d] Millennium 
no cognizable injury” and the company “lack[ed] standing to proceed with 
its petition” in court.69 The Court reasoned that even if NYSDEC had 
delayed for more than a year, the delay could not injure Millennium; rather, 
the delay would trigger the Act’s waiver provision, and Millennium could 
then present evidence of waiver directly to FERC to obtain the agency’s 
go-ahead to begin construction.70 In accordance with the Court’s 
instruction, the project thus went directly to FERC and presented evidence 
of NYSDEC’s waiver.71 FERC issued its Waiver Order in September 2017 
 
66.  Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., No. 17-1164 at 7 (citing Constitution Pipeline Co. 
LLC v. NYSDEC et al., 868 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2017); supra note 45. 
67.  Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., No. 17-1164, at 7. (citing Millennium Pipeline Co. 
v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
68. Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 700. 
71. Id. at 701. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or the Corps) has recently 
issued guidance to the effect that it will acknowledge and defer to the waiver decisions of 
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and subsequently a notice to proceed, allowing construction to 
commence.72 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision on the Valley Lateral project is in tension 
with previous authority on this issue, apparently reflecting a circuit split as 
to who has the final say on waiver. In AES Sparrows Point v. Wilson, for 
example, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the waiver period as it was 
interpreted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or the Corps).73 
Rather than directing the project to present evidence of waiver to FERC 
(the lead agency for the project at issue in that case) for a waiver 
determination, the Court held that the state agency had not, in fact, waived 
certification.74 Given the existence of contrary authority from different 
circuits, there is thus some ambiguity with respect to a project’s remedies 
for delayed certification decisions and the proper procedures for seeking a 
definitive determination of waiver at the conclusion of the one-year period. 
B.  Proper Scope of States’ Review  
Under the plain language of Section 401, a state’s WQC review is 
limited to whether a “discharge into . . . navigable waters” will comply with 
the applicable provisions of the CWA.75 While this language would seem 
to limit the scope of a state’s WQC review to water quality impacts from 
the “discharge” in question, over time some states have adopted a much 
broader scope. In other states where review has been limited (in accordance 
 
the lead agency on a project, which for energy project is often FERC. See USACE, 
Guidance, Implementation of EO 13807 and One Federal Decision within Civil Works 
Programs (Sept. 26, 2018) at 8 (“[I]n instances where the lead agency determines that 
certification requirements have been waived, e.g. the certifying agency has not acted within 
the time-period allowed by law, USACE will defer to the determination of the lead agency, 
determine that the certification requirement has been waived, and proceed accordingly.”). 
72.  Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 860 F.3d at 701. As explained above, NYSDEC 
subsequently challenged the Waiver Order in the Second Circuit, but that Court upheld 
FERC’s determination that NYSDEC waived its Section 401 authority by failing to act on 
the request within one year. NYSDEC v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 2018). 
73.  AES Sparrows Point v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721, 729–30 (4th Cir. 2009). 
74. Id. (deferring to Corps regulations on waiver at 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(1)(ii) and 
applying Chevron deference to the Corps’ interpretation of when the one-year waiver period 
had run). 
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). Notably, however, EPA regulations 
implementing Section 401 take a somewhat broader view, stating that the state’s 
certification must contain “[a] statement that there is a reasonable assurance that the activity 
will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards.” 
40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dep’t 
of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994) (holding that that “[Section] 401(d) is most reasonably 
read as authorizing additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole once the 
threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satisfied”). 
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with the statute) to the direct effects of the proposed “discharge,” third 
parties have challenged certifications alleging that the state’s analysis did 
not sweep broadly enough. Thus, the question of the proper scope of a 
state’s WQC review—and the related question of what types of conditions 
a state may impose in issuing certification—has been the subject of recent 
litigation.  
What kinds of impacts may a state reviewing authority consider? 
States are increasingly using the WQC process to evaluate the broader 
environmental impacts of a proposed project, even those that are unrelated 
or only indirectly related to water quality. For instance, NYSDEC denied 
WQC for the Millennium Valley Lateral natural gas pipeline project, on the 
basis that FERC’s environmental analysis of the project was deficient in 
failing “to consider or quantify the downstream greenhouse gas emissions 
from the combustion of the natural gas transported by the Project.”76 In 
doing so, NYSDEC cited a state regulation allowing the denial 
environmental permits for failure to meet the requirements of the state’s 
environmental review procedures, which NYSDEC deemed applicable 
even though FERC’s environmental review under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) took the place of environmental review 
conducted under the state’s environmental quality review act.77 NYSDEC’s 
denial was never challenged, as NYSDEC was subsequently deemed to 
have waived its certification authority by exceeding the one-year statutory 
deadline.78  
Other states have seen their certifications challenged on the basis that 
the scope of their Section 401 review was too narrow, with challengers 
alleging that states should evaluate not just impacts to waters and wetlands, 
but also “upland” impacts, i.e., terrestrial areas that are not covered by the 
CWA.79 The Fourth Circuit recently considered such arguments in a 
challenge to the WQC issued by the Virginia State Water Control Board 
(the Board) for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline project, a proposed interstate 
natural gas pipeline project in North Carolina and Virginia. The Board’s 
WQC actually contained two types of certification—one certification for 
the project’s use of Corps Nationwide Permit (NWP) 12, which applied to 
 
76. NYSDEC, Re: 3-3399-0071/00001 – Valley Lateral Project Notice of Decision 
at 2 (Aug. 30, 2017) (“Valley Lateral Notice of Decision”). 
77. Id. at 1 (citing 6 NYCRR § 621.10(f)).  
78. NYSDEC v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 2018). 
79. See, e.g., Va. Code § 62.1–44.15:80 (allowing the Virginia State Water Control 
Board, in making a WQC decision, to consider activities of a proposed project that impact 
upland areas that have the potential to affect water quality where a proposed pipeline project 
is greater than 36 inches in diameter). 
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the pipeline’s wetland, river, and stream crossings; and another “upland 
certification,” which covered the project’s proposed upland activities 
associated with construction, operation, maintenance, and repair of the 
pipeline as well as certain project-related surface water withdrawals.80 
The upland certification was challenged by third party groups who 
alleged that it should be vacated because, among other things, the Board 
failed to assess “combined impacts” on water quality that would result from 
multiple areas of construction within individual watershed areas and 
because the Board failed to conduct an adequate anti-degradation review.81 
The Court upheld the Board’s analysis, however, refusing to impose a 
requirement that the state agency conduct a separate review of the 
cumulative effects of pipeline construction in upland areas. As the Court 
explained, the Corps had already conducted such an analysis of the 
individual and cumulative impacts of linear utility projects using NWP 12 
and concluded that such impacts would be “no more than minimal.”82 There 
was thus no reason for the state to duplicate the Corp’s review.  
Additionally, the Court affirmed state expert agencies’ “broad 
discretion when developing the criteria for their Section 401 Certification” 
and the fact that “Section 401 does not require states to undertake a single 
cumulative review of all possible impacts in a single certification.”83 The 
Court also rejected the notion that the state was required to explicitly 
consider in its WQC review “the combined effects of multiple areas of 
construction within individual watersheds.”84 Finally, the Court rejected the 
argument that the upland certification was deficient because the state failed 
to conduct a separate anti-degradation review.85 Because application of the 
state’s technical standards and specifications for the project would prevent 
any degradation in water quality, and because the project’s sediment 
impacts on water would only be temporary, there was no need for the Board 
to conduct an individualized anti-degradation review.86 
 
80. Appalachian Voices et al. v. State Water Control Board et al., 2019 WL 177928 
at *2 (4th Cir. 2019).  
81. Id. at *3. 
82. Id. at *5.  
83. Id. 
84. Id. at *3. 
85. Id. at *7.  
86. Id. at *7–*8; see also Sierra Club et al. v. State Water Control Board et al., 898 
F.3d 383, 405 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the notion that individual anti-degradation review 
is triggered by minor and temporary exceedances of the state’s water quality criteria).  
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C.  Finality and Reviewability 
When is the certification “final” and reviewable under the NGA? 
The question of when a WQC is “final” is important not only in terms of 
its effectiveness and a project’s ability to rely upon the certification, but 
also in terms of the availability of judicial and/or state administrative 
review of the certification decision. The issue of finality has been of 
particular concern for projects subject to FERC oversight under NGA 
Section 7, which provides for “original and exclusive jurisdiction” in the 
federal courts of appeals over any civil action for review of a state 
administrative agency order or action issuing, conditioning, or denying a 
permit or other authorization required under federal law for interstate 
natural gas pipeline projects subject to Section 7 certification.87  
Many state laws also provide for review of such agency orders or 
actions via the state’s administrative appeals process. Some states issue 
WQC as a preliminary authorization that is not “final” until the period for 
seeking state-level administrative review of the certification has concluded. 
Other states make administrative review of a permitting decision available 
but not mandatory. In those states, a permit is final as issued but may be 
subject to further administrative review by the issuing agency or other 
reviewing body. State laws also vary on who has standing to invoke the 
review process, whether the permit is stayed pending review, and other 
procedural matters. 
Until recently, there was little case law on whether conclusion of the 
state administrative appeal process is a prerequisite to judicial review under 
the NGA exclusive jurisdiction provision and how these avenues for review 
of state permitting decisions relate to each other. Recent decisions from the 
First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals have attempted to “clarify” these 
issues but have, in practical effect, created more confusion than certainty.  
In Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline Co., LLC, the First Circuit considered whether the Court’s 
“exclusive” jurisdiction under NGA Section 7 to review issuance of a WQC 
by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) 
could be invoked even though the certification was undergoing review in 
the state administrative appeals process.88 Applying the “strong 
presumption that judicial review is available only following final agency 
action” and the principle that “[a]n agency action is ‘final’ only where it 
‘represents the culmination of the agency’s decision-making process and 
conclusively determines the rights and obligations of the parties with 
respect to the matters at issue,” the Court concluded that the certification as 
 
87. 15 U.S.C. § 717(r)(d)(1).  
88. Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 851 F.3d 
105, 108 (1st Cir. 2017).  
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issued was not final agency action reviewable under NGA Section 7. Three 
aspects of Massachusetts law contributed to this conclusion: (1) that the 
project’s WQC request “initiated a single, unitary proceeding, an essential 
part of which . . . is the opportunity . . . to have an adjudicatory hearing; (2) 
that the review provided under state law was de novo, i.e., its focus was the 
project’s application to MDEP and not the agency’s decision on 
certification; and (3) the state’s procedures bore the hallmarks of internal 
decision-making by the agency, rather than of the type of judicial review 
that would be preempted under the NGA.89 Thus, because the WQC was 
not yet “final” action by MDEP, the Court dismissed the petition for review 
for lack of jurisdiction under the NGA.90 
In Delaware Riverkeeper et al. v. Sec PA Dept. Env. Protection, et al., 
the Third Circuit also concluded—as the First Circuit had—that only 
“final” state agency actions are reviewable under the NGA’s exclusive 
jurisdiction provision.91 The Court determined, however, that the state-
issued water quality certification at issue was reviewable “final” action 
even though it was subject to further state-level administrative review 
because, under the relevant state law of Pennsylvania, the certification had 
legal effect as issued and was the final action of the agency that issued it.92 
In so holding, the Third Circuit distinguished Berkshire Environmental, 
finding that under the Massachusetts procedures at issue there, a WQC was 
issued as a “provisional order that could become final in the absence of an 
appeal.”93 By contrast, the Pennsylvania WQC was final action by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) and was 
thus reviewable by the Court as issued despite the availability under state 
law of further administrative review by a separate environmental hearings 
board.94  
One day after issuing its decision in Delaware Riverkeeper, the Third 
Circuit issued its ruling in Township of Bordentown, New Jersey et al. v. 
FERC et al.,95 in which it also considered whether state administrative 
processes for the review of environmental permits were preempted by the 
NGA exclusive jurisdiction provisions. In Township of Bordentown, the 
 
89. Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc., 851 F.3d at 112. 
90.  Id. 
91. Delaware Riverkeeper et al. v. Sec PA Dept. Env. Protection, et al., 903 F.3d 65 
(3d Cir. 2018).  
 92.    Id. at 72. 
93. Id. at 73.  
 94.    Id. 
95. Township of Bordentown, New Jersey et al. v. FERC et al., 903 F.3d 234 (3d 
Cir. 2018).  
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New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) issued 
certain water permits required under the CWA (including WQC) and New 
Jersey law.96 Third parties requested that NJDEP grant an administrative 
adjudicatory hearing, as provided under state law, to contest issuance of the 
permits. NJDEP denied the hearing request, stating as the sole basis for its 
denial its belief that the Third Circuit has “exclusive jurisdiction to review 
the issuance of permits regarding interstate natural gas pipeline projects” 
and that, accordingly, by operation of the NGA, the state administrative 
hearing process was preempted.97 The third parties challenged this 
determination in the Third Circuit. 
In analyzing their petition, the Court evaluated whether the term “civil 
action” in the NGA exclusive jurisdiction provision encompasses a state 
administrative proceeding and ultimately concluded that it does not.98 The 
Court explained that the term “civil action” applies exclusively to judicial 
cases and that state administrative review of interstate gas permitting 
decisions is not preempted by the NGA.99 The purpose of the NGA’s 
exclusive review provision therefore is “only [to remove] from states the 
right for their courts to hear civil actions seeking review of interstate 
pipeline-related state agency orders” made pursuant to federal law.100  
While these cases help to define the contours of federal appellate 
jurisdiction under NGA Section 717r(d)(1), they leave open several 
questions on the timing and effect of state administrative appeals of 
pipeline project permits, specifically whether such appeals may proceed 
concurrently with federal appellate review and whether and under what 
circumstances the state administrative process must be exhausted before 
seeking federal appellate review. These open questions are of significant 
consequence to the timing and progression of pipeline construction projects 
that rely on state authorizations issued pursuant to federal laws such as the 
CWA, CAA, and other statutes that delegate permitting authority to the 
 
96.  Township of Bordentown, New Jersey et al., 903 F.3d at 245. 
97. Id. at 246.  
98. Id. at 267.  
99. Id. at 268.  
100. Id. Having concluded that the NGA did not preempt the regular operation of 
New Jersey’s administrative review process, the court then analyzed whether the NJDEP’s 
erroneous interpretation violated New Jersey law—which, while it applies a deferential 
standard of review of state agency action akin to the federal standard, explicitly provides for 
no deference to the agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal 
issue. Finding that NJDEP’s interpretation of the NGA exclusive jurisdiction provision was 
unreasonable, the court remanded to NJDEP with instructions to reconsider the petitioners’ 
hearing request. 
1 - ELLIS AND DUNCAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019 1:34 PM 




states. The cases also indicate that the resolution of these questions will 
ultimately turn on the particulars of the state administrative process. 
The questions left open by the Third Circuit cases, at least, may 
ultimately be answered by the United States Supreme Court, before which 
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari requesting review of these decisions is 
currently pending.101  
III.  Possible Solutions 
There are numerous avenues—legislative, administrative, judicial 
and/or executive—that could be taken to remedy some of the issues of 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and lack of finality discussed above.  
A.  Legislative 
Legislation has been proposed on numerous occasions over the years 
in an attempt to clarify and refine the provisions of CWA Section 401, but 
unfortunately none have gained enough traction to become law.102 The 
latest attempt was the introduction of S. 3303, the “Water Quality 
Certification Improvement Act of 2018,” by Senator John Barrasso (R-
WY) on July 31, 2018.103 This bill would, among other things: (1) require 
 
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Delaware Riverkeeper et al. v. Sec PA Dept. Env. 
Protection, et al. (Jan. 9, 2019).  
102. Claudia Copeland, Clean Water Act Section 401: Background and Issues, 
Congressional Research Service Report, July 2, 2015, at 5–7(summarizing the various 
legislative proposals).  
103. S.3303 was proposed in response to the recent denial of WQC by the 
Washington State Department of Ecology (WDEC) for the Millennium Bulk Terminals 
Project, a $680 million coal export facility planned to be constructed on a former industrial 
site near the Columbia River in western Washington State. In its September 2017 decision 
denying certification, WDEC noted “significant unavoidable adverse impacts” identified in 
the environmental review conducted for the project, such as air quality, increased vehicle 
traffic, noise and vibration, construction impacts on minority and low-income populations, 
cultural and tribal resource issues, etc. WDEC, In the Matter of Denying Section 401 Water 
Quality Certification to Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview, LLC, Order # 15417 (Sept. 
26, 2017). WDEC also stated that the Project’s WQC application failed to demonstrate 
“reasonable assurance that the Project as proposed will meet applicable water quality 
standards and other appropriate requirements of state law.” Id. at 13. The project appealed 
the denial to State superior court and the Washington State Pollution Control Hearings 
Board. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, while the Board upheld WDEC’s decision 
in August 2018. The project also appealed the denial in federal District Court for the Western 
District of Washington, claiming among other things that WDEC’s WQC denial was 
preempted by various federal statutes governing rail and vessel transportation. The Court 
granted summary dismissal of the project’s preemption claims in December 11, 2018, on 
standing grounds and finding no preemption of the WDEC decision. Order on Defendants’ 
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states to identify in writing within 90 days of receiving a request for 
certification all specific additional materials or information that will be 
necessary for the state to make a final decision on a request for certification; 
(2) make changes to the statutory text to clarify that the state’s review is 
limited to the impact of the “discharge” and not the activity as a whole and 
that the proper scope of review is limited to water quality concerns; (3) 
require states to publish their requirements for certification; and (4) require 
states to set forth the grounds for their decisions granting or denying WQC 
in writing to the applicant.104 
S. 3303, if enacted, would make measurable improvements to the 
WQC process—but the bill’s provisions could be enhanced to provide even 
greater certainty to applicants by incorporating a clear avenue for federal-
level appeals (and a means for federal override) of a state’s decision on a 
project’s WQC application or to adjudicate claims that the state waived its 
authority by exceeding the one-year time limit for review. Such a process 
could be modeled off of the process specified under CZMA Section 307, 
which requires applicants for federal licenses or permits to conduct 
activities affecting the coastal zone of a particular state to provide a 
certification that the proposed activity complies with the state’s coastal 
zone management plan.105 Such certifications are subject to state review 
and, within six months, a determination by the state whether it objects or 
concurs with the applicant’s certification.106 Like CWA Section 401, 
CZMA Section 307 provides that the federal license or permit may not be 
granted until the state has either concurred with the applicant’s certification 
or until, by the state’s failure to act, the concurrence is conclusively 
presumed.107 But unlike CWA Section 401, the CZMA provides a 
mechanism for an applicant to appeal a state’s objection to the Secretary of 
Commerce.108 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), located in the Department of Commerce, has developed detailed 
regulations governing such appeals, which allow the Secretary to approve 
the activity seeking a federal license or permit over the state’s objection 
 
and Intervenor-Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Lightsource Resources 
Inc. et al. v. Inslee et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018). 
104. S.B. 3303, 115th Cong. 2d Session (July 31, 2018).  
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(C) (1992).  
106. Id.  
107. Id. 
108. Id. The CZMA also allows the Secretary to override the state’s decision, on her 
own initiative, upon finding that the proposed activity is consistent with the objectives or 
purposes of the Act, or is necessary in the interest of national security. Id.  
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upon finding that the “activity is consistent with the objectives or purposes 
of the CZMA, or is necessary in the interest of national security.”109 
Revising the CWA to incorporate a similar appeal and review process 
could help alleviate the ambiguities and uncertainties in the current Section 
401 certification process, particularly if the revision allowed federal-level 
review of a state’s denial of WQC, and a definitive way to seek a 
determination that the state had waived certification by failing to act within 
one year. Congress would have to delegate authority over this process to a 
federal agency, likely EPA (given its statutory responsibility for 
implementing the CWA)—but such reviews could also go through FERC 
for projects under its jurisdiction, given the Commission’s role as lead 
agency for conducting NEPA review and coordinating federal 
authorizations for projects subject to NGA Section 7.  
B.  Administrative 
As the agency charged with CWA implementation, EPA is in the best 
position to provide clarifying guidance on the Section 401 process via 
regulation. Unfortunately, EPA regulations implementing CWA Section 
401 were promulgated in 1971 and have not been updated since 1979. They 
provide minimal criteria for states in issuing certifications, and they do little 
to clarify what constitutes a “request” for certification starting the statutory 
waiver period.110 Further, the EPA regulatory provision on “waiver” 
provides little specificity in describing the timeframe for a state to act on a 
WQC application before the requirement will be deemed waived.111 The 
regulations do not specify what constitutes a “request” for certification, nor 
do they clarify that one year is the outside time limit for certification 
 
109. 15 C.F.R. Part 940, Subpart H. The NGA specifically accounts for this appeal 
mechanism by excluding CZMA decisions (or alleged failures to act under the CZMA) from 
the judicial review provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d).  
110. See 40 C.F.R. § 121.3 (providing, with respect to WQC applications, that “[a] 
licensing or permitting agency shall require an applicant for a license or permit to include 
in the form of application such information relating to water quality considerations as may 
be agreed upon by the licensing or permitting agency and the Administrator”) (emphasis 
added).  
111. See 40 C.F.R. § 121.16 (providing that “[t]he certification requirement with 
respect to an application for a license or permit shall be waived upon . . . [w]ritten 
notification from the State or interstate agency concerned that it expressly waives its 
authority to act on a request for certification; or . . . [w]ritten notification from the licensing 
or permitting agency to the Regional Administrator of the failure of the State or interstate 
agency concerned to act on such request for certification within a reasonable period of time 
after receipt of such request, as determined by the licensing or permitting agency (which 
period shall generally be considered to be 6 months, but in any event shall not exceed 1 
year)”). 
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decisions—including the resolution of any state administrative appeals 
process to review a certification once issued.112 
To improve certainty in the CWA Section 401 certification process, 
EPA could modify its regulations to establish more clearly how the CWA 
one-year statutory deadline will apply to state certification decisions.113 
Short of modifying its WQC regulations, EPA should withdraw its Section 
401 Handbook, which was issued as “interim” guidance in 2010 without 
public comment and has never been updated or revised to reflect recent 
developments in Section 401 case law. Despite never being finalized, the 
Handbook is seen as authoritative by many federal agencies and states 
looking for definitive guidance on the Section 401 process. 
In withdrawing the Section 401 Handbook and issuing revised 
guidance, EPA should clarify basic statutory principles of timing, waiver, 
and scope of review that are supported by recent developments in the case 
law. The revision could improve the process by establishing that state’s 
one-year clock begins to run upon receipt of an initial application and by 
explaining—in accordance with recent case law—that state agency 
practices intended to prolong the certification process (such as requiring an 
applicant to withdraw and resubmit a certification application) are 
inconsistent with the plain language and purposes of the CWA. It could 
explain that, in accordance with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Millennium 
Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, the lead federal agency—not the State—determines 
whether a “reasonable period of time (not to exceed one year)” has been 
exceeded. It could also clarify that the state’s review under Section 401 is 
properly focused on water quality and that matters unrelated to water 
quality are outside of the intended scope of review. 
C.  Judicial 
As explained above, judicial decisions interpreting aspects of CWA 
Section 401 have in some instances created more questions than answers. 
Judicial resolution of some of the uncertainties in the WQC process is thus 
perhaps the least desirable avenue to Section 401 reform, because of the ad 
hoc nature in which judicial decisions are handed down and the fact that 
 
112. Cf., Airport Communities Coalition v. Graves, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (W.D. 
Wash. 2003) (holding that the Corps, as the federal permitting agency, was required to 
incorporate into a Section 404 permit only those conditions included in a state’s certification 
that were issued within the CWA one-year statutory deadline, and that it had no obligation 
to include those conditions imposed as a result of a state administrative challenge that was 
not resolved until after the one-year statutory period for certification had concluded). 
113. For example, EPA regulations governing the certification of federally issued 
CWA Section 402 NPDES permits allow states sixty days to issue certification, specifying 
that the period runs “from the date the draft [federal] permit is mailed to the certifying State 
agency.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.53(a)(3).  
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lower courts are not able to prescribe uniform solutions that apply 
nationwide. 
There are, however, current opportunities for the courts to increase 
clarity in this area. For example, as noted above, there is currently a cert 
petition pending before the United States Supreme Court, seeking review 
of Third Circuit decisions that have created some confusion concerning the 
relationship between the state administrative review process for WQCs and 
federal appellate courts’ exclusive review of state-issued authorizations for 
interstate natural gas pipeline projects under NGA Section 7. Uniform 
decisions from the Supreme Court on issues such as this could be helpful 
in providing guidance on the Section 401 process going forward.  
D.  Executive 
Finally, it has been recently reported that the current presidential 
administration is considering an attempt at resolving issues with the CWA 
Section 401 certification process via executive action.114 While the 
contours and timing of such action remain unclear, it would be consistent 
with other initiatives of the administration to streamline regulatory reviews 
and permitting for needed energy and infrastructure projects.115  
IV. Conclusion 
The Section 401 certification requirement is just one example of how 
the CWA preserves an important role for the states in the oversight of water 
quality. Congress intended this role, however, to compliment the federal 
government’s role in approving and overseeing interstate energy and 
infrastructure projects—and never intended for local interests to override 
the federal interest in developing energy resources and related 
transportation infrastructure. 
Since its original enactment, the implementation of CWA Section 401 
has created tensions between state and federal oversight roles for large-
scale energy and infrastructure projects. In recent years, this tension has 
reached a high watermark, with states using their WQC authority to impede 
projects that have received federal authorization to proceed or, where the 
 
114. See, e.g., Ari Natter and Jennifer Dlouhy, Trump Eyes Action to Limit States’ 
Powers to Block Pipelines, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/NH6V-688H. 
115. See, e.g., Presidential Memorandum, Streamlining Permitting and Reducing 
Regulatory Burdens for Domestic Manufacturing (Jan. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13771, 
82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017); 
Exec. Order No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463, 40,463 (Aug. 15, 2017). The ability of such 
an order to reform state agency projects is uncertain, however. The “One Federal Decision” 
process established under Executive Order 13807, for instance, does not cover state agency 
authorizations, even where the state agency is acting pursuant to federal law. 
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state issues certification, with advocacy groups targeting the certification 
to derail projects already determined to be in the public interest. 
Clarification of the fundamentals of the WQC process may help to provide 
clarity and to improve the process for all stakeholders, including the states. 
The best way to ensure durable reform of the WQC process is for Congress 
to revise the statute, as recently proposed by the introduction of S. 3303 in 
the Senate. Further improvements to increase clarity, efficiency, and 
finality in the Section 401 process could be achieved via administrative, 
judicial, and possibly executive action.  
  
1 - ELLIS AND DUNCAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019 1:34 PM 




* * * 
